In this paper, I explore the reactions of financial market participants to news relating to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), a body that regulates aspects of global diamond production and trade. I use an event study approach with data on the returns for shares of leading global mining and jewelry retail companies over the period from 1999 to 2011.
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Introduction
In 1998, the non governmental organization (NGO) Global Witness launched a campaign against "blood diamonds", publicizing the link between diamond production and armed conflict. Not long after, Robert Fowler and a UN panel of experts submitted a report to the UN Security Council detailing the ways in which armed groups evaded sanctions in Angolawhich was at that time embroiled in a long running civil war (UN Panel of Experts, 2000) .
The report discussed the role of diamonds in funding the armed group Uniao Nacional Para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA), and provided evidence of actors in the diamond mining and jewelry industries evading UN sanctions.
Also bringing attention to illicit diamond trading in the late 1990s were the brutal tactics of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) during the civil war in Sierra Leone, which drew global condemnation and resulted in a United Nations Security Council ban on the trade of all diamonds originating in that country.
Later that year, the UN Security Council passed a resolution supporting the creation of a global certification procedure for diamonds. The ultimate multinational response brought about the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), a control and certification body that came into force in 2003 in Interlaken, Switzerland. The KPCS guidelines left individual state members to draft and pass the requisite legislation, and to monitor companies and individuals operating within their jurisdictions.
The KPCS grew to cover 76 represented countries by early 2012 (Kimberley Process, 2012) . This group included all major diamond producing countries (covering 99.8% of global rough diamond production), and involved the majority of large national consumer markets.
Also represented in KPCS were advocacy and industry observers, including Global Witness and De Beers, the world's largest diamond mining company. Member states agreed to trade diamonds solely with other member countries, and to halt trade with members who were suspended for violating KPCS rules. The Kimberley Process also required that a KPCS certificate accompany every compliant diamond sold on the international market. 2 Industry actors participated in the development and promulgation of KPCS recommended policies, as well as many aspects of the scheme's implementation. This industry involvement proved to be a contentious issue among academics, politicians, business leaders and advocacy organizations, but many KPCS advocates eventually saw the involvement as a means of providing incentives for companies to comply with KPCS regulations. Many saw the system as benefiting the diamond industry by protecting its reputation against charges of supporting violence in diamond producing countries.
The World Diamond Council, a global industry body formed in 2000 to address regulatory drives against conflict diamonds, eventually voted to support the creation of the Kimberly
Process. The move prompted many to claim that trade restrictions against violent groups in smaller countries would benefit large scale diamond companies, and that the primary motivation of companies for supporting the initiative was to gain advantages in the market:
"…this new international system restricts supply and enhances the power of big, established players. It keeps the warlords and the small diggers and the shady traders out of the acceptable stream of commerce. It also imposes costs (for tagging, monitoring and auditing) that make it even more difficult for new or smaller players to enter the global market." (Spar, 2006) Haufler (2009) proposes that the majority of industries targeted by advocacy groups in recent years are not as ideal for KPCS type regulations because the diamond industry is more concentrated than other industries. Haufler supposes that benefits accrue to mining and retail jewelry companies in the diamond industry, but argues that these are peculiarities of the specific industry rather than a guide for future efforts. The literature on sanctions, including the most commonly cited theoretic model from Kaempher and Lowenberg (1992) , also suggests that restrictions are more likely when there is industry support in the sending country due to local benefits from regulations.
If the KPCS were mostly beneficial for incumbent companies as some of these, and other
scholars have argued, we should expect investors and other market participants to have re evaluated companies in a positive light due to new information about the likelihood of Please see Appendix A for a discussion of the Kaempher and Lowenberg (1992) model.
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regulations. If the companies were publicly traded, we would also expect that the returns on securities of these companies would increase if there were good news about the prospects of the industry.
Using such an approach in another context however, La Ferrara and Guidolin (2007) show that in some cases, violent conflicts can benefit diamond mining companies. La Ferrara and
Guidolin use micro level data to demonstrate that the exogenous shock of the death of the rebel leader in Angola (and subsequent end of the conflict there) was interpreted as "bad news" for diamond mining companies with activities in the country, corresponding with a 4
per cent decrease in abnormal returns. The authors interpret this result as indicating that aspects of armed conflicts such as the weakening of state power and the increase in barriers to entry can benefit some stakeholders. Insofar as incumbent companies did in fact benefit from conflict situations, we should expect that credible regulations to ensure that diamonds produced in conflict environments do not reach markets would harm some mining interests.
Taking this debate as a starting point for the analysis of the effects of the near global regulations on companies in the diamond industry, there are several critical questions that have not been conclusively answered in the literature:
1) Did the KPCS have real effects on the diamond industry?
2) If so, do events and policy decisions related to the KPCS continue to be relevant?
3) Again if the KPCS has measurable effects on the diamond industry, what was the direction of these effects and did the regulations benefit specific segments of the industry?
To anticipate the findings in this paper, I show that the development and implementation of the KPCS was viewed by stock market participants as having real impacts on the value of companies in the diamond industry. I also show that the majority of abnormal returns related to the creation of the KPCS were negative for mining companies globally. Moreover, I show that some retail jewelry companies appear to have been negatively impacted by events which called into question the credibility of the Process. These results suggest that the KPCS was expected to have real effects on mining companies that were not unconditionally beneficial for them, and that regulation likely created incentives for retail jewelry companies to maintain the credibility of the Process.
I proceed as follows: Section 2 describes the event study methodology I employ. Section 3 describes the data I use in the analysis, and Section 4 describes the results. Having established that returns were indeed significantly abnormal, in Section 5 I turn to a discussion and interpretation of the main findings. Section 6 concludes.
Event Study Methodology
Event studies focus on "event windows" -the period of time during which investors learn about the event that is under study. In the following sections, I predict returns for securities during a given event window using estimates from an "estimation window" -an extended period prior to the event -using ordinary least squares regression. I then compare the predicted returns to actual returns to see the degree to which returns during the event window were abnormal in comparison the expected performance of the security.
The event study approach is based on the assumptions of the constant expected return model (CER) that, as a regression model, is expressed:
The term is the return on security at time and is expected return. The error term in the expression is a Gaussian white noise (GWN) process.
As applied to event studies, a common formulation of the regression model emphasizes the specific time period during which an event of interest took place, and that expected Where is again the return on security at time and is the systematic risk for security . The term refers to the market return for the security exchange on which trades, and is again a stochastic error term with a mean=0 and variance . The dummy variable is equal to one during the event window and zero otherwise, and is equal to the number of days of the event window. The term accounts for the difference between the actual return and the predicted return, which is usually referred to as the "abnormal return" in event studies.
In the following analysis, I look at an event window of several days because "news" or information about the value of a security does not circulate instantaneously for all market participants. The full effect of the event is a summation of the daily abnormal returns over the event window, which is referred to as the cumulative abnormal return or :
Under normal circumstances, the expected should be equal to zero. A statistically significant shift away from expected returns however, signifies that new information has caused a re evaluation:
This is often expressed in the event study literature as simply the error term summed over the event window, rather than the defining the abnormal portion alongside a separate error term Implied by (1) , the term is defined as the deviation of the random return from its expected value 6 Most trade restrictions do not affect all companies in the same way, as regulations could be beneficial for some firms (leading to a positive CAR) and harmful for others (leading to a negative CAR). The two types could be defined as those companies that would be expected to benefit from regulations ( ), and those that would be expected to be harmed ( ) by regulations. Rewriting the null and alternate hypotheses, the approach is expressed:
And:
As in , both and state that the expected CAR =0. But in this more explicit statement of the null and alternate hypotheses, the same event could characterize opposite impacts depending on the company type.
Data
The historical stock returns I use in the following analysis are publicly available. To compare performance, I pair stock returns with a national index from the country where the exchange is located. Table 1 lists the indices I use in the following analysis. 
Results
Below I list event dates with at least one event window showing significant abnormal returns. Although there are many ambiguous dates (where statistical significance depends on the length of the event window), several are clearly significant over both event window lengths and immediately stand out.
On the 5 th of July, 2000, the UN Security Council imposed a worldwide ban on diamonds from Sierra Leone. Although fewer large scale producers were involved in the primarily alluvial diamond mining operations present in Sierra Leone at that time, mining companies posted abnormally negative returns coinciding with the Security Council ban, and while smaller, the dip in returns for jewelry firms nears statistical significance over the three day event window.
In the United States, the Act of Congress that brought the country into compliance with the KPCS was considered in several forms before a final version passed. The first version,
A full list of companies used in the following analysis is included in appendix B.
A full list of dates used in the following analysis is included in Appendix C. 
Analysis
None of the statistically significant events studied in this analysis affected both jewelry and diamond mining companies at the same time and in the same direction, which suggests that the interests of the two company types with respect to regulations and markets were more separate over the issues investigated here than expected.
The events that most affected diamond mining companies appear to be related to regulations at the national or UN level. Both the Security Council decision to ban diamonds exported from Sierra Leone and the events corresponding to US ratification of KPCS compliant legislation drove down returns for diamond mining companies. Over the three day event window for the ban on Sierra Leone, cumulative returns for mining companies were nearly 7% below expected performance, and nearly 9% below over the five day window. Passage of the Act from the US Senate corresponded with a 2.4% lower than expected return over the three day window, 2.7% over the five day window. Final US ratification corresponded with returns that were 3.2% lower than expected over a three day window and 3.8% lower than expected over the five day window.
These results suggest that overall the KPCS was not expected to help diamond mining companies, as some analysts suggest. This does not preclude the possibility that protection from competition benefited some firms in some respects, but as a whole the regulations were not looked as "good news" for diamond mining companies.
One event that may coincide with a report on the failure of the KPCS in Brazil approaches significance over the 3 day window and is significant over the 5 day window. The results are in large part driven by a single company however, Mountain Lake Resources Inc., which did not have any diamond production in Brazil.
Figure 1
This result could arise due to several factors, or a combination of them. The KPCS regulations could entail a high cost of implementation, and the laws could have been expected to place higher cost on firms operating in developed countries (which are more likely to be traded on exchanges) than in less developed economies. Another possibility is that some diamond mining companies did well by operating in the circumstances surrounding armed conflicts, as La Ferrara and Guidolin (2007) suggest was the case in Angola.
Retail jewelry companies however were more sensitive to events that could impact the retail demand for diamonds. Although not all such events were significant for jewelry companies, those events that were significant and positive were most often those that supported the credibility of the KPCS, whereas those which were negative undermined that credibility. For example, when Ian Smillie left the KPCS, jewelry retail companies experienced significantly lower than expected returns. Likewise, when Wikileaks cables revealed that diamonds that were certified as conflict free had in fact been sourced in an area experiencing armed conflict, jewelry retailers again experienced lower than expected returns. These are the results one would expect were jewelry companies expected to benefit more from a KPCS program that was seen as credible as otherwise. Other cases which seemed to benefit jewelry retail companies were events which opened competition in the market for diamond production and vice versa. When the UN Security Council banned diamonds from Côte d'Ivoire, returns were abnormally low for jewelry retailers, perhaps reflecting the reduction of competition in diamond production. 
Appendix A: Interest Groups and the Kaempher and Lowenberg model
In the Kaempher and Lowenberg (1992) model, interest groups are formed based upon common interests, describing the perspective of a group as a single utility maximizing unit (Kaempfer, 1987) . Individual is a member of population and maximizes utility according to:
, where , and
, and
Income for individual as , and as the individual's initial endowment. The term is a non negative and continuous variable which describes the level of sanctions that are applied to another state or group of economic actors. The model assumes that individuals maximize utility, which is a function of their income, but also a function of sanctions.
Splitting the population into three types , and considering representatives of each of these groups each member has a different reaction to the costs of sanctions. Let and so that for income increases with sanctions against another country, for income decreases with sanctions against another country, and for income is unaffected.
Because the 's and the 's will be competing against one another, they will be willing to pay for additional sanctions in the bargaining process, up until the point that paying more will leave them with less utility than the sanction being implemented (or not implemented):
And Equating the two clears the political market for sanctions if, by assumption, there are no deadweight losses in the initial bargaining process, and for small changes around the marginal utilities of all individuals, regardless of their groups, are identical. The term is the unit price of sanctions, which are relevant to both the 's and the 's. The 's are willing to pay some price to have sanctions put into place, and the 's are willing to pay some price to keep sanctions from increasing. The market for sanctions then depends on the degree to which the individuals of each group are willing to "pay" in their support of or opposition to sanctions.
Crucially, group can shift the equilibrium point, and has more utility in the case that sanctions are put in place but not due to income effects. This implies that alliances between s (such as NGOs), and s (such as un sanctioned firms) could overwhelm sanction detractors or targets, causing redistribution away from the no sanction equilibrium and towards benefiting non sanctioned producers.
Meaning that the sum of all incomes is exactly the same regardless of bargaining outcome
To consider free riding problems we could include: Another feature of this type of competition is free riding, as everybody of the same type has an incentive to signal a lower willingness to pay than they actually have. ;
And are shift parameters which are meant to reflect the free riding that will occur in both of the groups. 
